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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [EAID](#) [ETTC](#) [SU](#) [UK](#)
SUBJECT: (C) SUDAN: FCO THOUGHTS ON INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES FOR BASHIR

Classified By: PolCouns Richard Mills; reason 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) In keeping with the Secretary's speech of September 27, the UK is thinking about possible incentives if the Government of Sudan does the right thing on Darfur, and possible disincentives if it does not. FCO-DFID Sudan Unit Deputy Head James Thornton shared UK thoughts with Poloff September 29, stressing that no decision has been taken within HMG. The idea, Thornton said, would be to put it to President Bashir that he faces a strategic choice: either cooperate and gain advantages, or - after a limited window of opportunity - face negative consequences for failing to cooperate. Thornton cited four areas where the GOS's cooperation is needed:

- stop the offensive in Darfur;
- accept the transition from AMIS to the UN and allow AMIS to be bolstered in the interim;
- engage more positively with the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement; and
- allow humanitarian access.

¶2. (C) INCENTIVES: The potential incentives Thornton said are under consideration are (in no particular order):

- ICC: Assurances that regime figures will not be arrested and put on trial. This is controversial within Whitehall, but it is possible per Article 16 of the Rome Statute for the UNSC to decide to suspend the ICC's investigation for one year.
- Debt relief: The U.S. Treasury is key, and has been reluctant, Thornton said.
- USG bilateral steps: Lifting trade sanctions, removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and upgrading diplomatic relations to ambassador level. Thornton mentioned his understanding that the mood in Congress might not be conducive to such steps now.
- Reconstruction: Thornton was not sure the GOS cares about this (for instance, the technical assessment team currently in Sudan cannot get to all the places it needs to in Darfur, so the donors conference planned for October will probably

need to be delayed). He also lamented that "the West" has not delivered on all its promises regarding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, notably in regard to debt relief.

- Invitations: Bashir could be invited to make high-status visits to Washington, London and perhaps other capitals.

- African Union Presidency: Bashir thinks he has that in the bag already.

13. (C) DISINCENTIVES: Thornton made clear that the UK's thinking on disincentives is even less advanced, but he mentioned the following:

- African Union Presidency: If African states could be persuaded to threaten to deny Bashir the presidency of the AU, he might care deeply.

- UN Arms Embargo: This could be extended from Darfur to the entire country.

- UNSCR 1591: Sanctions could be imposed on more individuals. Thornton mentioned that the US Department of Justice requires substantial evidence of personal involvement in order to list an individual.

- Blanket bans: The entire Sudanese regime leadership could be subjected to travel ban and/or asset freeze. Alternatively, such blanket bans could be applied only to those regime figures that opposed the desired cooperation (to get the SPLM off the hook).

14. (C) Post stands ready to facilitate discussion with FCO of these or other ideas as the Department may direct.

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